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OPINION OF THE COURT 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 The threshold issue presented by this appeal is whether 
an administrative agency, specifically the Pennsylvania Board of 
Vehicle Manufacturers, Dealers and Salespersons ("Pennsylvania 
Board of Vehicles"), should be considered a "State court" for 
purposes of allowing removal from it under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) 
(1988).  The issue is a legal one over which our review is 
plenary. 
I. 
 In September 1992, Sun Buick, Inc., t/a Sun Buick-Saab, 
Inc., and Eugene Schlanger (collectively "Sun Buick"), who 
operated a Buick dealership, purchased a Saab franchise and 
entered into a franchise agreement with Saab Cars U.S.A., Inc. 
Sun Buick operated the Saab dealership out of the same location 
that it was operating the Buick dealership it owned.   
 On January 26, 1993, Sun Buick entered into an 
agreement to sell the Saab franchise to intervenor Stephen 
Melnick.  The agreement was contingent on Melnick securing a 
dealership from Saab and he began to complete the necessary 
paperwork.  In the meanwhile, on February 11, 1993 Sun Buick sold 
the Buick dealership to S.B.I. Management Corp.  S.B.I. took over 
Sun Buick's lot space and its dealer license, thereby divesting 
the Saab dealership of both a location and a license. 
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 Because Saab had informed S.B.I. that Saab operations 
could not continue on that lot, Sun Buick suggested to Saab two 
alternative locations on which it could operate the Saab 
dealership until completion of the sale to Melnick.  Saab 
rejected the suggested locations allegedly because it had not 
been given enough time to evaluate them, noting that allowing a 
relocation at that time would create instability as the 
dealership would presumably be moving again once it was sold. 
 In a letter dated February 23, 1993, Saab rejected 
Melnick as a dealer on the ground that he did not have the staff 
or facilities to begin operation of a dealership.  In the same 
letter, Saab terminated its franchise with Sun Buick on three 
grounds:  (1) Sun Buick lost its dealer license when it sold the 
Buick dealership on February 11; (2) since that time and 
continuing at least seven business days, no Saab operations were 
conducted at the approved facility; and (3) Sun Buick's interest 
in the approved facility was terminated in breach of its 
obligation to maintain the facility.   
 The termination was effective immediately although Saab 
acknowledged that Pennsylvania law requires that a manufacturer 
give a dealer 60 days notice before termination except in a 
situation where "the nature or character of the reason for 
termination . . . is such that the giving of such notice would 
not be in the public interest."  Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 63, 
§818.9(c) (Supp. 1993).  Saab claimed that immediate termination 
was in the public interest because Saab operations had ceased and 
Sun Buick was unlicensed.  Saab alleged that it wished to be able 
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to establish replacement Saab representation as soon as possible 
so that Saab customers in the area would have access to service. 
 On March 2, 1993, Sun Buick filed a complaint with the 
Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles alleging that Saab's actions 
violated the Board of Vehicles Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 63, 
§818.1 et seq. (Supp. 1993), by terminating the franchise without 
good cause and the required 60 days notice,2 and in bad faith. 
Sun Buick also alleged that Saab had unreasonably withheld 
consent to the sale to Melnick in violation of section 
818.9(b)(3).3  On March 17, Sun Buick filed a second complaint 
with the Board of Vehicles alleging that Saab "improperly and 
unfairly rejected the request for approval of the relocation of 
[Sun Buick's] dealership facility."  App. at 37.  The Board 
consolidated the two complaints. 
                     
2Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 63, § 818.9(c) (Supp. 1993) provides in 
relevant part that: 
 
It shall be a violation of this act for any 
manufacturer . . . to unfairly, without due 
regard to the equities . . . and without just 
provocation cancel the franchise of any 
distributor. . . .  Not less than 60 days 
advance notice of such termination . . . 
shall be given . . . unless the nature and 
character of the reason for termination . . . 
is such that the giving of such notice would 
not be in the public interest. 
 
 
3Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 63 § 818.9(b)(3) (Supp. 1993) provides that 
it is a violation of the Act for any manufacturer to: 
 
Unreasonably withhold consent to the sale, 
transfer or exchange of the franchise to a 
qualified buyer capable of being licensed as 
a new vehicle dealer in this Commonwealth. 
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 Saab removed the action to federal district court on 
March 29, 1993.  Melnick filed a motion to intervene, Sun Buick 
moved to remand to the Board, and Saab moved to dismiss.  The 
district court filed an opinion and order on June 23, 1993: (1) 
denying a remand; (2) granting a dismissal for failure to state a 
claim; and (3) dismissing the motion to intervene as moot.  Sun 
Buick and Melnick appeal.4 
II. 
 We must consider at the outset the underlying 
jurisdictional issue presented by the district court's refusal to 
remand this case to the Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles.  28 
U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1988) governs the removability of actions from 
state to federal court and provides in relevant part that "any 
civil action brought in a State court of which the district 
courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be 
removed by the defendant" (emphasis added).  Although Sun Buick 
did not contend in its brief that the Board of Vehicles was not a 
"court" for purposes of section 1441, we raised the issue sua 
sponte pursuant to our obligation to be assured of our own 
jurisdiction.  See Trent Realty Assocs. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n, 657 F. 2d 29, 35 (3d Cir. 1981) ("A federal court is bound 
to consider its own jurisdiction preliminary to consideration of 
the merits."). 
A. 
The "Functional Test" 
                     
4Melnick did not file a timely appeal but we granted his motion 
to intervene on behalf of the appellants. 
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 On its face, the removal statute limits removal to 
cases pending before a state "court."  This should be 
dispositive, as the Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles is, by 
definition, not a "court." 
 The district court found, nonetheless, that the 
Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles was a "court" for purposes of 
removal because "an examination of its functions . . . revealed 
that it was acting in an adjudicatory manner rather than in an 
administrative one."  District court op. at 3-4.  In so holding, 
it was following the prior determination by a judge of the same 
court in Corwin Jeep Sales & Service, Inc. v. American Motors 
Sales Corp., 670 F. Supp. 591, 594-95 (M.D. Pa. 1986), which 
treated the Pennsylvania Board as a "court" because it would be 
adjudicating a dispute between private parties, interpreting a 
franchise contract and utilizing the same procedures that courts 
use in deciding such disputes. 
 The genesis of the "functional test" for purposes of 
removal appears to have been the decision in Tool & Die Makers 
Lodge No. 78 International Ass'n of Machinists v. General 
Electric Co. X-Ray Dep't, 170 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. Wis. 1959), in 
which the district court refused to remand to the Wisconsin 
Employment Relations Board complaints filed by unions alleging 
that an employer had engaged in unfair labor practices and 
violated the collective bargaining agreement.  The court found 
that the Employment Board was a "court" because the subject 
matter was in essence breach of contract, the procedures that the 
Board employed, e.g., taking depositions and issuing subpoenas, 
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were those of a court, and the Board could enter an order 
requiring the person complained of to cease and desist from the 
contract violations and reinstate the employees with or without 
pay. 
 Two decades after the Tool & Die decision, the Court of 
Appeals of the Seventh Circuit adopted the "functional test" to 
allow removal from an administrative agency.  In Floeter v. C. W. 
Transport, Inc., 597 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1979), the court held 
that the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission was a "court" 
for removal purposes.  The court adopted a "functional test" that 
requires "evaluat[ing] the functions, powers, and procedures of 
the state tribunal and . . . the respective state and federal 
interests in the subject matter and in the provision of a forum." 
Id. at 1101-02.  In deciding removal was proper, the court relied 
on the facts that the action was one for breach of contract 
between private parties, it would have to be decided by federal 
law, the procedures and process of the Commission were 
essentially judicial, and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin had 
recognized that the Commission was vested with "judicial power." 
Id. (quoting Layton Sch. of Art & Design v. Wisconsin Employment 
Relations Comm'n, 262 N.W.2d 218, 230 (Wis. 1978)). 
 Similarly, the First Circuit has stated, albeit in 
dictum, in Volkswagen de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Labor 
Relations Board, 454 F.2d 38 (1st Cir. 1972), that an action 
before the Puerto Rico Labor Relations Board would be removable 
under the "functional test."  The court reasoned that the 
proceedings before the Board were between private parties and 
8 
involved essentially a breach of contract dispute. Significantly, 
the court relied on the judicial nature of the Board in general 
and not just on the judicial nature of the current proceedings by 
emphasizing the Board's "lack of rule-making or 'legislative' 
power," "its adjudicative format," and the reference by the 
Puerto Rico Supreme Court to the Board's function as being a 
"quasi-judicial" one.  Id. at 44 & n.9.  The court lastly 
reasoned that, in balancing federal and state interests, the 
federal interest in deciding federal law outweighed whatever 
interest the state may have.  See id. at 45.  
 The "functional test" was also used by the Fourth 
Circuit in Kolibash v. Committee on Legal Ethics, 872 F.2d 571 
(4th Cir. 1989), in its holding that a United States Attorney 
could remove a state bar disciplinary proceeding to the federal 
court.  The court reasoned that the proceeding was adjudicatory 
in nature in that the Committee was an arm of the state court and 
conducted itself as a court in holding evidentiary hearings and 
taking testimony.  See id. at 576.  The force of Kolibash on the 
issue before us is diminished, however, because removal in 
Kolibash was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a),5 the federal officer 
removal statute, which is broadly construed, as distinguished 
                     
528 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (1988) provides in relevant part: 
 
A civil action or criminal prosecution 
commenced in a State court against any of the 
following persons may be removed by them to 
the district court . . . : 
 
   (1) Any officer of the United 
States . . . for any act under 
color of such office . . . . 
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from section 1441, the removal statute here, which is strictly 
construed.  See id; Abels v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 770 
F.2d 26 (3d Cir. 1985) (28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) "should be strictly 
construed and all doubts should be resolved in favor of remand"). 
 In contrast to some of the above cases, the functional 
test was disapproved in County of Nassau v. Cost of Living 
Council, 499 F.2d 1340 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974), where the 
court rejected removal from the Cost of Living Council which had 
issued an order limiting pay increases.  The court stated that 
section 1441(a) contemplates removal from other court proceedings 
rather than the "interruption of administrative proceedings." Id. 
at 1343; see also California Packing Corp. v. I.L.W.U. Local 142, 
253 F. Supp. 597, 598-99 (D. Haw. 1966) (holding removal from 
administrative agencies improper because statute speaks to 
removal only from courts and finding Tool & Die reasoning 
"strained"). 
 The courts that have adopted the "functional test" for 
interpreting what is a "court" under section 1441 have relied in 
large part on the reasoning used by the Supreme Court in Upshur 
County v. Rich, 135 U.S. 467 (1890), where the Court held that 
notwithstanding the nomenclature of "county court" as the entity 
from which removal was sought, the case did not involve a 
removable "suit".  It is true that the Court looked to the actual 




The principle . . . is, that a proceeding, 
not in a court of justice, but carried on by 
executive officers in the exercise of their 
proper functions, as in the valuation of 
property for the just distribution of taxes 
or assessments, is purely administrative in 
its character, and cannot, in any just sense, 
be called a suit . . . . 
 
 [T]he appeal from the assessment was 
made to the 'county court' eo nomine, yet 
that this is not a judicial body, invested 
with judicial functions, except in matters of 
probate; but is the executive or 
administrative board of the county, charged 
with the management of its financial and 
executive affairs. 
 
Id. at 477; see also Village of Walthill v. Iowa Elec. Light & 
Power Co., 228 F.2d 647, 648-53 (8th Cir. 1956) (holding removal 
from the Nebraska "condemnation court" improper in that "[t]he 
three-judge condemnation court [was] in reality just another 
board of appraisers").   
 It does not follow that because Upshur County held that 
a court is not necessarily a "court" for removal purposes, the 
Supreme Court has endorsed the view that an administrative agency 
might be a "court" for removal purposes.  Therefore, we find 
questionable the reasoning of the Tool & Die court that the 
Supreme Court has adopted a functional test which would require 
us to judge the propriety of removal from a tribunal "by 
reference to the procedures and functions of the State tribunal 
rather than the name by which the tribunal is designated."  170 
F. Supp. at 950.   
 There is further evidence in other Supreme Court 
decisions from the same era that Upshur County did not broadly 
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adopt a "functional test" by which an administrative body would 
be treated as a "court" for federal removal purposes simply 
because it performs a judicial function.  In those cases, when 
the Court held that removal was proper it was careful to note 
that the body in question was a judicial body under state law. 
For example, in Madisonville Traction Co. v. Saint Bernard Mining 
Co., 196 U.S. 239, 250-51 (1905), the Court stated: 
We cannot doubt, in view of the authorities, 
that the case presented in the County Court 
was a "suit" or "controversy between citizens 
of different States," within the meaning of 
the Constitution and the laws of the United 
States.  It was, as already said, a judicial 
proceeding initiated in a tribunal which 
constitutes a part of the judicial 
establishment of Kentucky, as ordained by its 
Constitution . . . ; and the court, although 
charged with some duties of an administrative 
character, is a judicial tribunal and a court 
of record. 
(emphasis added). 
 Similarly, in Commissioners of Road Improvement 
District No. 2 v. St. Louis Southwestern Railway Co., 257 U.S. 
547, 556-57 (1922), the Court, in upholding a removal from an 
Arkansas County Court, noted that the Arkansas constitution 
invested that court with "judicial power" and that the state 
supreme court had "held the County Court to be a court and 
capable of rendering judgment in a proceeding whose judicial 
character is much more questionable than here."  We have found no 
case from the Supreme Court, nor have the parties cited one, 
holding that a case can be removed from an administrative agency 
to federal court on the grounds that the administrative agency is 
functionally a court. 
12 
 This court has previously examined the status of 
administrative agencies as "courts" in another context, i.e., the 
section of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (1988), 
which provides that a private citizen enforcement action may not 
proceed if "the Administrator or State has commenced . . . a 
civil action in a court of the United States or a State."   42 
U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(B) (1988) (emphasis added).  In Baughman v. 
Bradford Coal Co., 592 F.2d 215 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 
961 (1979), we had to decide whether the federal court had 
jurisdiction over the private action notwithstanding that the 
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources had already 
begun an action against the same defendant before the 
Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board.  We stated that for 
that purpose, "an administrative board may be a 'court' if its 
powers and characteristics make such a classification necessary 
to achieve statutory goals."  Id. at 217.  However, we held that 
the Pennsylvania Hearing Board was not a court in that it "lacked 
the power to enjoin violations" of the company's effluent 
restrictions, was "empowered only to assess a penalty which 
[could] not exceed $10,000," and there was "lack of citizen 
intervention of right in the agency proceeding."  Id. at 218-219. 
 We considered the identical citizen suit provision, 
albeit in the Clean Water Act, in Student Public Interest 
Research Group v. Fritzsche, Dodge & Olcott, Inc., 759 F.2d 1131, 
1136 (3d Cir. 1985), where we held, relying on Baughman, that an 
EPA enforcement action was not a "court" proceeding.  We 
characterized the Baughman inquiry as a dual one: 
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The first question to be answered is whether 
the coercive powers that the administrative 
agency possesses compel compliance with 
effluent limitations . . . .  The second 
inquiry concerns the procedural similarities 
the agency proceeding might have to a suit in 
federal court. 
 
Id. at 1137.  We noted that the EPA's enforcement powers under 
the Act were very limited, consisting of the power to issue 
"permits, modify permits, and terminate permits for 
noncompliance," and that it could not impose any civil penalty, 
while a district court could assess fines of up to $10,000 a day. 
Id. at 1138.  We also noted that the procedure the EPA followed 
in its enforcement proceedings did not resemble that of a court 
in that there was no independent decisionmaker, no witnesses, no 
records kept, and no evidence presented by opposing parties.  See 
also Proffitt v. Commissioners, Township of Bristol, 754 F.2d 
504, 506-07 (3d Cir. 1985) (under identical citizen suit 
provisions in other environmental statutes, EPA's compliance 
order not a suit in a court because the administrative tribunal 
did not have "power to accord relief equivalent to that available 
from a court").   
 We need not decide the viability of the dictum in these 
cases suggesting that a court's right to proceed with a citizen's 
suit in an environmental case might be precluded by action before 
an administrative agency as well as before a court, because the 
issue here is a different one.  However, it is of some interest 
that the Baughman reasoning was rejected by both the Second and 
Ninth Circuits.  In Friends of the Earth v. Consolidated Rail 
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Corp., 768 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1985), the Second Circuit interpreted 
the same citizen suit provision of the Clear Air Act that was at 
issue in Baughman.  The court, reasoning that when a statute is 
unambiguous the court's task is simply to enforce it as written, 
held that it would be "inappropriate to expand th[e] language to 
include administrative enforcement actions" as equivalent to 
those of civil actions in a "court."  Id. at 62.  Similarly, the 
Ninth Circuit rejected Baughman in Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc., 834 F.2d 1517, 1525 (9th Cir. 1987), stating "[w]e prefer 
the Second Circuit's reading . . . over the Third Circuit's 
reading."  The court emphasized that it would not take the 
"extraordinary step of ignoring the plain language of the 
statute."  Id.  
 Even if we were still inclined to follow Baughman's 
application of the "functional" test for purposes of permitting 
maintenance of a private citizen enforcement suit in 
environmental litigation, the removal context is sufficiently 
distinct to make the cases distinguishable.  What is significant 
is that no case in this court ever held that an administrative 
agency was actually a "court."  Nevertheless, we may pretermit 
the decision whether removal under section 1441(a) from an 
administrative agency is ever permissible in an exceptional case, 
because it is clear that the Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles would 
not qualify under any circumstances.     
B. 
Status of the Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles 
15 
 Under any test, the Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles 
would not qualify as a court because its lack of judicial 
attributes is similar to that of the agencies which we held were 
not courts in the environmental cases.  As we stated in Baughman, 
"[g]enerally, the word 'court' in a statute is held to refer only 
to the tribunals of the judiciary and not to those of an 
executive agency with quasi-judicial powers."  592 F.2d at 217. 
It follows that even if an entity is not called a "court," it 
must have the attributes of a court before it should be 
considered as one. 
 Rather than possessing the powers of a court, the 
Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles administers and enforces the Board 
of Vehicles Act.  It regulates the licensing of salespersons, 
dealers, brokers and manufacturers.  It passes on the 
qualifications for licensure, investigates allegations of 
wrongful acts, and brings criminal prosecutions for unauthorized 
practices (i.e. acts as a prosecutor).  An examination of the 
Board's powers and duties makes it clear that its powers are 
those of the usual type of administrative agency rather than 
those of a court.6   
                     
6Section 818.4 entitled "Powers and duties of board" provides: 
 
The board shall have the power and its duty 
shall be to: 
 
   (1) Provide for and regulate the licensing 
of salespersons, dealers, brokers, 
manufacturers, factory branches, 
distributors, distributor branches, factory 
or distributor representatives and 
wholesalers as defined in this act. 
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   (2) Review and pass upon the 
qualifications of applicants for licensure 
and to issue, except as otherwise provided 
herein, a license to engage in the said 
businesses to any applicant who is approved 
by the board and who meets the requirements 
of this act. 
 
   (3) Investigate on its own initiative, 
upon complaint of the Department of 
Transportation, Department of Community 
Affairs, Department of Revenue or the Office 
of the Attorney General, or upon the verified 
complaint in writing of any person, any 
allegations of the wrongful act or acts of 
any licensee or person required to be 
licensed hereunder. 
 
   (4) Administer and enforce this act and to 
impose appropriate administrative discipline 
upon licensees found to be in violation of 
this act. 
 
   (5) Bring criminal prosecutions for 
unauthorized, unlicensed or unlawful 
practices and bring an action to enjoin such 
practices. 
 
   (6) Require each licensee to register 
biennially with the board. 
 
   (7) Keep a record showing the names and 
addresses of all licensees licensed under 
this act. 
 
   (8) Keep minutes and records of all its 
transactions and proceedings especially with 
relation to the issuance, denial, 
registration, formal reprimand, suspension 
and revocation of licenses.  In all actions 
or proceedings in any court, a transcript of 
any board record or any part thereof, which 
is certified to be a true copy by the board, 
shall be entitled to admission in evidence. 
 
   (9) Adopt, promulgate and enforce such 
rules and regulations not inconsistent with 
this act as are deemed necessary and proper 
to effectuate the provisions of this act, 
17 
 In the cases following Baughman where we determined 
that various administrative actions were not proceedings in a 
"court," we held that an administrative agency would not be 
considered a court if it did not have the "power to accord relief 
equivalent to that available from a court."  Proffitt, 754 F.2d 
at 506-07.  The Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles does not have such 
power in that it cannot award damages.  Its powers of action to 
afford relief are circumscribed: it can only enjoin a franchise 
termination alleged to be in violation of section 818.9(c) or the 
addition or relocation of a new vehicle dealer that is in 
violation of section 818.18,7 and it can impose disciplinary 
sanctions.  As the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court has 
recognized:  
                                                                  
including but not limited to, established 
place of business. 
 
   (10) Submit annually, to the 
Transportation Committees of the House and 
Senate, a description of the types of 
complaints received, status of the cases, 
board action which has been taken and length 
of time from the initial complaint to final 
board resolution. 
 
   (11) Submit annually to the department an 
estimate of the financial requirements of the 
board for its administrative, investigative, 
legal and miscellaneous expenses. 
 
   (12) Submit annually to the House and 
Senate Appropriations Committees, 15 days 
after the Governor has submitted his budget 
to the General Assembly, a copy of the budget 
request for the upcoming year which the board 
previously submitted to the department. 
7Section 818.18 governs when a new vehicle dealer may be 
established or relocated into a relevant market area where the 
same line-make is already represented. 
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The Act provides for a temporary stay in the 
event of a franchise termination appeal 
brought under Section 9(c).  It does not, 
however, imbue the Board with injunctive 
powers in any other area.  Consequently, any 
determination by the Board that a 
manufacturer has acted unreasonably in 
withholding consent to the sale of a 
franchise under Section 9(b)(3) could result 
only in a disciplinary sanction against the 
manufacturer. 
University Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Board of Vehicle 
Manufacturers, 576 A.2d 1146, 1150 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990).   
 The limited nature of the Board's powers was also 
emphasized in Trailmobile, Inc. v. State Board of Manufacturers, 
612 A.2d 574 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992), appeal denied, 634 A.2d 226 
(Pa. 1993): 
 The Act grants certain disciplinary 
powers to the Board.  When the Board 
determines that a violation of the Act has 
been committed it may formally reprimand, 
suspend the license of, or refuse to issue or 
renew the license of the violator. 
Additionally, Section 19 of the Act provides 
that the Board may levy a civil penalty of 
$1,000 upon any current licensee who violates 
a provision of the Act. 
 
 We reject Tri-State's request for 
additional relief because the Act is specific 
in its grant of power to the Board.  We have 
already stated that the power and authority 
to be exercised by administrative commissions 
must be conferred clearly and unmistakably by 
the legislature; a doubtful power does not 
exist.  Other than the temporary stay that 
may be issued in a suspected violation of 
Section 18 of the Act, and the permanent 
injunction that may issue if the Board 
determines that there is good cause for not 
permitting the addition or relocation of a 
new vehicle dealer under Section 18, the Act 
does not grant the Board injunctive powers. 
 
19 
Id. at 576 (citations omitted).  The fact that the Board can only 
assess fines of $1,000 is significant considering our reliance in 
Baughman on the Environmental Hearing Board's ability to impose 
fines of only $10,000 as one of the factors influential to our 
finding that the Board was not a "court."  592 F.2d at 1218.  
 We assume that the Pennsylvania legislature expressly 
provided that any person who may be injured by a violation of the 
Act may bring an action for damages, including punitive damages, 
or equitable relief including injunctive relief in any court of 
competent jurisdiction8 in recognition of the Board's inability 
to award damages or full injunctive relief. 
 Not only does the Pennsylvania Board of Vehicle's have 
a dearth of judicial-type powers but its composition also has 
none of the characteristics of a court such as disinterestedness, 
                     
8Section 818.20 entitled "Civil actions for violations" provides: 
 
   (a) Action for damages. -- Notwithstanding 
the terms, provisions or conditions of any 
agreement or franchise or other terms or 
provisions of any novation, waiver or other 
written instrument, any person who is or may 
be . . . injured in his business or property 
by a violation of a provision of this act 
relating to that franchise, or any person so 
injured because he refuses to accede to a 
proposal for an arrangement which, if 
consummated, would be in violation of this 
act, may bring an action for damages and 
equitable relief, including injunctive 
relief, in any court of competent 
jurisdiction. 
 
   (b) Punitive Damages. -- If any person 
engages in continued multiple violations of a 
provision or provisions of this act, the 
court may award punitive damages in addition 
to any other damages under this act. 
20 
separation from the executive and learnedness in the law.  The 
Board is composed of three new car dealers, three used car 
dealers, one mobile home dealer, one salesperson, one 
recreational dealer, one motorcycle dealer, the Commissioner of 
Professional and Occupational Affairs, the Secretary of the 
Department of Transportation or his designee, the Director of 
Consumer Protection in the Office of Attorney General or his 
designee and four members of the general public having no 
connection to the vehicle business.  See Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 63, 
§ 818.3(a) (Supp. 1993).  This composition is unlike that of a 
court in that it is composed mostly of people who have jobs other 
than that of serving as judges, see Pa. Const. art. 5, § 17(a) 
(mandating that judges devote full time to their judicial 
duties), and includes members of the executive branch as well as 
persons who are likely to be partial toward dealers and their 
industry.  While lay persons may sometimes be well versed in the 
law, the absence of any requirement of legal knowledge or 
experience by almost all of the members of the Board is striking. 
 Additionally, Pennsylvania, itself, does not consider 
the Board a court.  See Trailmobile, 612 A.2d at 576; University 
Lincoln Mercury, 576 A.2d at 1150.  It is not described in the 
portions of the Pennsylvania Constitution related to its court 
system, see Pa. Const. art. 5, or in the Pennsylvania statutes 
relating to the court system.  See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. et 
seq. (1981 & Supp. 1993).   
 In enumerating the ways in which the Pennsylvania Board 
of Vehicles is unlike a court, it becomes clear that Floeter, 
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Volkswagen, and Tool & Die are distinguishable on their facts. In 
both Floeter and Volkswagen, the administrative agencies had been 
acknowledged by their state supreme courts as having judicial 
powers, and the agencies had more judicial powers and procedures 
than the Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles has.  The Tool & Die 
court relied in part on powers that the administrative agency at 
issue there had that exceeded the powers of the Board of 
Vehicles, namely, ordering the affirmative relief of 
reinstatement of employees with pay.  
 Finally, we note that the district court in this case 
adopted the analysis used in Corwin Jeep Sales, 670 F. Supp. at 
593-95, when it held that removal was proper if the Board "was 
acting in an adjudicatory manner rather than in an administrative 
one."  District court op. at 3-4.  However, this reasoning 
inappropriately conflates two requirements of the removal 
statute.  Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), "any civil action" of which 
the district courts have original jurisdiction and was "brought 
in a State court" may be removed to the district court.  The 
requirement that it be a "civil action" is separate from the 
requirement that it be brought in a "State court." 
 The distinction was made clear in Commissioners of Road 
Improvement District No. 2 v. St. Louis Southwestern Railway, 257 
U.S. 547, 550 (1922), where the Supreme Court analyzed these 
requirements separately in deciding whether a proceeding in a 
state county court "to assess benefits and damages growing out of 
a road improvement was properly removed to the federal District 
Court."  The Court, after noting that the county court had been 
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recognized by the state supreme court to be a court, went on to 
examine the proceeding to determine whether it was a "judicial 
controversy," as opposed to an administrative concern: 
Of course, the statutory designation of the 
action of a body as a judgment, or the 
phrasing of its finding and conclusion in the 
usual formula of a judicial order, is not 
conclusive of the character in which it is 
acting.  When we find, however, that the 
proceeding before it has all the elements of 
a judicial controversy, to wit, adversary 
parties and an issue in which the claim of 
one of the parties against the other capable 
of pecuniary estimation, is stated and 
answered in some form of pleading, and is to 
be determined, we must conclude that this 
constitutional court is functioning as such. 
 
Id. at 557 (citation omitted). 
 If we analyze the status of the Pennsylvania Board of 
Vehicles separately from the nature of the proceedings before it, 
it becomes clear that, in general, the Board's procedures, 
functions, and character do not make it a court.  It is therefore 
irrelevant whether the proceeding may qualify as a "civil action" 
because it is a contract dispute between two private parties, or 
even whether it could be brought as an original proceeding in the 
district court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.  The 
matter was not brought in a "State court" and therefore was not 
removable under section 1441(a). 
 III. 
 Applying the general principle that the removal statute 
is to be strictly construed, we hold that an administrative 
agency without the attributes of a court should not be considered 
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a "State court" under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).  Therefore, we will 
reverse the judgment of dismissal of the district court and 
remand this case to the district court with directions that it be 
remanded to the Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles. 
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